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ABSTRACT 
 
Since bankruptcy prediction became a popular research topic in the mid-1960s the model used for 
evaluating the research has remained largely unchanged.  A matched-pair sample design 
combined with a dichotomous classification test has been the standard.  This is quite useful from 
an academic perspective, but totally useless for any practical application.  When evaluating the 
paired-sample, the assumption is that random chance will correctly classify 50% of the companies 
as bankrupt or not, and any model that exceeds this is doing better than chance.  In the real world, 
of the 10,000 companies that trade on exchanges, only 600 will go bankrupt - this is a 6% failure 
rate, so any model should do better than 94% accuracy, not 50%.  Some companies might be 
eligible for bankruptcy, but choose not to file.  They might instead threaten to file, and negotiate 
concessions from creditors.  If this company was classified as bankrupt, would that be a correct or 
incorrect prediction?  The classic evaluation model would classify that as a miss, but is it really?  
This paper addresses the shortcomings of bankruptcy prediction evaluation models and suggests 
that bankruptcy is better represented as a continuum, rather than a dichotomous situation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
sing financial statement information to predict bankruptcy has been a popular academic topic since 
Altman’s (1968) paper.  Beaver published somewhat earlier (1966, 1968) but did not focus on 
bankruptcy; rather financial distress and insolvency (close cousins).   
 
 The concept of predicting bankruptcy was not entirely new, even at that time, but the application by Altman 
of a more sophisticated statistical technique (multiple discriminant analysis (MDA)) caught the academic 
community’s attention.  Since then the bankruptcy prediction literature has become voluminous, some utilizing very 
advanced mathematical techniques.   
 
 When bankruptcy prediction studies are subject to replication, the results are not nearly as good as 
originally achieved (see Platt & Platt (1990) for a comparison of the models’ predictive abilities).  The models 
developed do not stand the test of “robustness.”  This could be caused by a number of factors.  One reason might be 
that the statistical models tend to use matched pairs of bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies.  The variable data is 
then used to determine cutoffs (thresholds) to differentiate bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies.  The data used to 
derive the thresholds is year specific, and tends to correctly differentiate companies in the hold-out sample (which 
are from the same time period).  These cutoffs work less well when applied in different time periods (including use 
in replication studies).   
 
 Another reason for the deteriorating accuracy of bankruptcy prediction studies might be the variables 
selected to be incorporated into the model.  Starting with Beaver, most research has used variables that were selected 
based on prevalence and popularity in the literature.  Stemming mostly from being related to or thought to be 
indicative of liquidity, and liquidity being synonymous with solvency, these variables have been used with minor 
additions, deletions and adjustments. 
 
 Altman (1968) started with a very large set of financial statement variables then winnowed them down 
using MDA based on the variables’ contribution to differentiating bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies.  Altman 
U 
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(and pretty much all papers that followed) selected variables without the benefit of the theoretical development of 
what a bankrupt company should look like.  Necessarily, there needs to be a discussion of what bankruptcy is and 
what it means, and then develop the set of financial statement variables that would display this.  Without this hard 
look at what a bankrupt company would look like, it is not surprising that bankruptcy prediction models do not stand 
the test of time. 
 
 A major fallacy of these prediction models is the manner in which success is defined - they are 
academically nuanced in a practical setting.  In these studies, it is known in advance which companies are bankrupt 
and then these bankrupt companies are matched with known non-bankrupt companies from the same time period.  A 
model that predicts better than 50% (the assumed rate of chance) is thought to out-perform random guessing.  This is 
not the case.  A better standard of excellence would be to say that if there were 10,000 publicly traded companies in 
that time period and 600 went bankrupt, based on chance, 6% of the companies go bankrupt.  Given the opportunity 
to select whether a company is bankrupt or not from a list of all companies, selecting not-bankrupt would be correct 
94% of the time.  A model needs to outperform this standard, not the contrived matched-pair 50% prediction level, 
since any practical use of the prediction model would be applied in the 10,000/600 environment.  Testing should 
include random samples drawn from a list of all public companies. 
 
 Any practical application involves taking a company and making a prediction of whether they will go 
bankrupt.  In the 1960s (and perhaps 70s as well) bankruptcy was a last result, so the dichotomous classification test 
would have been more appropriate in that time frame, as companies would use a bankruptcy filing only as a last 
resort.  Over time bankruptcy has taken on strategic importance and lost much of its stigma, so a new evaluation 
framework must be developed to encompass these changes, as well as to make it useful in a practical setting. 
 
THEORY 
 
 Perhaps one of the major inappropriate leaps made by previous research was equating bankruptcy with 
liquidity (lack of) and insolvency.  Bankruptcy comprises two major types: Chapter 7 (liquidation) and Chapter 11 
(reorganization).  Liquidity and insolvency would appear to be closely related; however bankruptcy is not 
synonymous with liquidity or with insolvency.  Payne and Hogg (1994) quote from the transcript of the bankruptcy 
case of Johns-Manville: “The court noted that there is no insolvency requirement for Chapter 11 filings; the point of 
the reorganization Chapter is to provide the debtor with an automatic stay so that he has time to formulate a plan to 
restore the profitability of the business.” (p23) 
 
 Insolvency could lead to bankruptcy, but because a company has filed for bankruptcy does not mean that 
they are insolvent.  Likewise, there is no requirement that the insolvent company file for bankruptcy.  They may try 
to solve their financial problems without resorting to bankruptcy court.  Therefore, liquidity ratios may be poor 
differentiators of the solvent, bankrupt company, and while models might predict a company is bankrupt when the 
company did not file, the model might be accurate in profiling the company despite the lack of a bankruptcy 
petition. 
 
 Filing for bankruptcy has many costs and certain benefits.  Some of the costs include stigma, filing fees, 
professional fees, higher cost of capital, possible loss of employees, deteriorating morale and potential stock market 
reaction.  On the benefit side, the company gets temporary protection from creditors, possible voiding of certain 
contracts including union agreements, as well as other benefits (see Payne & Hogg (1994) for a thorough review of 
the costs and benefits). 
 
 
 
 Bankruptcy is a legal condition where a company has petitioned the federal court (the bankruptcy court) 
under Chapter 7 (liquidation) or Chapter 11 (reorganization) (other possible Chapters are ignored, since Chapters 7 
and 11 are the most prevalent).  A trustee is then appointed and creditors (who tend to stand to lose all or a portion 
of the money owed, preferences, rights, or at the very least, must now wait an extended period for payment) are 
given a chance to object to the filing.  The trustee then has to decide whether to grant the petition or not. 
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 While insolvency is not a precondition for bankruptcy, a company must answer the question of why they 
need protection from creditors (in a Chapter 11 filing).  An apparently solvent company has to document that there 
is something missing from the financial statements that would render it insolvent at some future point.  This might 
be the potential loss of a lawsuit, an unrecorded contingent liability or some other significant, dire matter.  A filing 
based on the desire to negate a union contract would not be granted. 
 
 Therefore, there can be two groups of bankrupt companies – those that demonstrate insolvency and those 
that are not insolvent, but can document potential insolvency.  For those companies not presently insolvent, 
bankruptcy prediction using financial statement variables is difficult because by definition the potential insolvency-
creating event is not reflected in the financial statements.  Operationalizing variables to differentiate these 
companies might rely on narrative information contained in the footnotes to the financial statements or perhaps the 
opinion. 
 
 To evaluate any model, the first and most important question is “what is a correct prediction?” and the 
complimentary “what is an incorrect prediction?”  Using the dichotomous classification test it would seem to be 
simple to evaluate whether a prediction was correct or not, based on the prediction and the outcome (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 
Prediction Matrix 
Prediction Outcome Bankrupt Not Bankrupt 
Filed Correct Incorrect 
Did Not File Incorrect Correct 
 
 
 Despite, the convenience with which that evaluation model can be applied to research, it is not efficacious 
in determining which models are effective at predicting bankruptcy.  The population who would use a bankruptcy 
prediction model for anything other academic research would encompass, largely, investors and creditors.  Because 
bankruptcy has costs, they want to gauge whether their equity or debt investments would be at risk.  At the time they 
are making their assessments, they have no idea of the population of bankrupt companies.  All companies that they 
are considering are a candidate for bankruptcy.  In academic research, the individual making the prediction would 
know a priori that half the companies are bankrupt and half are not.  No such knowledge is available in a practical 
setting. 
 
 The concept of bankruptcy being a dichotomous situation is spurious.  It is true that a company has either 
filed for bankruptcy or has not filed, but that misses the point of the research.  Any company that has the ability to 
avail themselves of a bankruptcy filing stands to have the potential to receive creditor concessions on a voluntary 
basis whether they file or not.  The evaluation model must take this into account to be useful in a non-academic 
setting. 
 
Literature Review 
 
 The dichotomous classification test has been the standard model for use in evaluating bankruptcy 
prediction models.  See Figure 2 for a list of the papers that used the dichotomous classification test. 
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Figure 2 
Papers Utilizing the Dichotomous Classification Test 
 
Altman, Edward (1968) 
Aziz, Abdul, David C. Emanuel, Gerald H. Lawson (1988) 
Aziz, Abdul, Gerald H. Lawson (1989) 
Beaver, William H. (1966)  
Beaver, William H. (1968)  
Camp, Woody (1993) 
Carcello, Joseph V., Dana R. Hermanson, Fenwick H. Huss (1995)  
Casey, Cornelius J., Norman J. Bartczak (1984)  
Casey, Cornelius, Norman Bartczak (1985)  
Deakin, Edward B. (1972)  
Dugan, Michael T., Christine V. Zavgren (1988)  
Edmister, Robert O. (1972)  
Foster, Benjamin P., Terry J. Ward (1997)  
Gentry, James A., Paul Newbold, David T. Whitford (1985)  
Gilbert, Lisa R., Krishnagopal Menon, Kenneth B. Schwartz (1990)  
Grice, John Stephen, Robert W. Ingram (2001)  
Kim, Choong Nyoung, Raymond McLeod Jr. (1999)  
Mensah, Yaw M. (1984)  
Morris, Richard (1998)  
Platt, Harlan D., Marjorie B. Platt (1990)  
Ricci, Cecilia Wagner (2003)  
Shah, Jaymeen R., Mirza B. Murtaza (2000)  
Sung, tae Kyung, Namsik Chang, Gunhee Lee (1999)  
Wilc Wilcox, James W. (1971) 
 
   
 
 
 The typical application of the dichotomous classification test is to match known bankrupt companies with 
non-bankrupt companies from the same standard industry classification code and of similar asset size.  From the 
population of these matched pairs, a number of companies are put into a hold-out sample, the rest are subjected to 
the model. 
 
  The model classifies each of the companies as bankrupt or not, then a comparison to the actual state is 
done, and error percentages calculated.  The model is then applied to the hold out sample to determine error 
percentages.  A comparison is then done among the sample, the holdout sample and the assumed rate of chance 
(50%). 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 The basic, underlying, inescapable problem with the current dichotomous evaluation model is that 
bankruptcy can no longer be thought of as a dichotomous variable.  The purpose of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
petition is to give a company time to reorganize and return to profitability.  This same end could potentially be 
achieved by the company threatening creditors with the possibility of having to file a bankruptcy petition.  If the 
company can get the creditors to accept concessions, then the company might attain all of the benefits they would 
have received from a bankruptcy petition without having to undertake any of the costs or burdens. 
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 Given this, the model has to take into account what previously would have been considered errors: 
 
 the company meets the criteria for a filing but chooses not to 
 the company is not insolvent but chooses to file 
 
 Incorporating this into a model is not easy.  The beauty of the dichotomous classification test was that it 
was simple and direct to apply.  The failing was that it has no value in a contemporary, practical setting.  Developing 
a useful evaluation model will involve creating a continuum of a bankrupt company, with the difficulty them 
becoming assessing how well the model did.  This will be a topic for future research. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The current dichotomous classification test, the standard used in evaluating bankruptcy prediction research, 
fails to correctly classify situations that would be very important to users outside of an academic environment.  A 
company might be eligible to file for bankruptcy, but chooses not to, using the potential as leverage to obtain 
concessions from creditors.  A prediction model might have predicted the company to be bankrupt and since there 
was no filing, this would be counted as an error.  However, the company used the potential of filing as a way to 
negotiate every benefit they might have gotten from a filing, and therefore the model should be considered to have 
correctly classified this. 
 
 Bankruptcy is more of a continuum than a dichotomous variable.  A new way of evaluating predictions has 
to be developed and applied to models to make them useful in a practical setting.  Creditors, lenders and potential 
investors do not sit down with two lists of companies; one list bankrupt and one not, jumble up the companies and 
then select the non-bankrupt.  Real-world use starts with a list of companies without a priori knowledge of how 
many are/will be bankrupt and then the model is asked to classify each.  This is how users will apply the model, and 
this is how the evaluation of the model should proceed.  
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